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Alois Pichler
RefLecTions on A PRominenT 
ARgUmenT in THe WiTTgensTein DebATe
Abstract. Does the way authors treat their own works tell us something 
about how these works are to be understood? not necessarily. but then 
a standard argument against the “new Wittgenstein” comes under ques-
tion. The argument is: the undogmatic interpretation of Wittgenstein’s 
Tractatus cannot be correct, since Wittgenstein himself later treats it as 
a work that holds certain positions. my response is: the argument is 
only correct if the answer to four specific questions is “yes.” The main 
purpose of the paper is to bring issues of philosophical authorship more 
into focus within Wittgensteinian interpretation.
I
Wittgenstein’s later critique of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus1 plays an important part in the ongoing debate about the 
“new Wittgenstein.”2 The nW claims that both the Tractatus and the 
Philosophical Investigations3 are intended and designed by Wittgenstein as 
undogmatic works, i.e., works that want to give us insight into philosophi-
cal questions and problems without ending up with theses other than 
ones that would be acceptable to all—thus, trivial theses. According to 
the Investigations, a trivial thesis in philosophy is noncontroversial and 
one that “everyone would agree to” and “it would never be possible to 
debate” (§128). 
opponents of the nW think that its position cannot be correct 
because Wittgenstein’s own serious occupation with, and his critique 
of, the Tractatus show that he regarded it as a work that holds anything 
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but trivial noncontroversial views and statements. Wittgenstein himself 
had, thus, later read the Tractatus in a way that is not in line with an 
undogmatic interpretation. since this argument against the nW wants 
to conclude (or helps to conclude) the debate on the interpretation of 
the Tractatus by resorting to later statements by Wittgenstein—a contex-
tual element—i will call it the “contextual” argument against the nW.4 
it seems to me that the contextual argument can be challenged in 
several ways. However, rather than merely trying to question this argu-
ment, i want to use it to help approach Wittgenstein’s later critique of the 
Tractatus in a way that is as methodologically grounded as possible, and 
thus to help draw from Wittgenstein’s critique only those consequences 
for the understanding of the Tractatus that are justifiable. one result 
from this will be that questions of philosophical authorship and their 
relevance for issues of philosophical interpretation are brought more 
into the focus of Wittgenstein studies.
in my paper i raise four questions. While the contextual argument 
seems to imply tacitly that these questions find a positive answer, i will 
challenge this assumption. my demonstrations are, i hope, not only 
relevant for the respective issues prompted by the contextual argu-
ment, but also for other matters within Wittgenstein studies. The fourth 
question will lead us to the issue of the Investigations’ attitude towards 
the Tractatus. This is the most important issue in the assessment of 
Wittgenstein’s critique of the Tractatus.
II
several scholars in Wittgenstein research have raised concerns 
about contextual approaches, i.e., approaches that resort to text-
external sources in order to identify the meaning of a text or work by 
Wittgenstein.5 Although usually focusing on the Investigations, these 
concerns also apply to interpretations of the Tractatus. supporters as 
well as opponents of the nW employ contextual arguments to cor-
roborate their respective positions. it would therefore be appropriate 
to analyze critically the contextual arguments both for and against the 
nW. in this paper, however, i only deal with the contextual argument 
used by opponents of the nW. The following discussion will, among other 
things, refer to the model of authorship that the contextual argument 
seems to presuppose.
Here are my four questions:
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(i)  is it certain that both the texts dealing with the Tractatus, and the 
Tractatus itself, talk about the same things?
(ii)  is it certain that the positive assertions which the later critique locates 
within the Tractatus are also held by the author of the Tractatus as 
positive assertions? 
(iii)  is it certain that the function of the critique of the Tractatus is cor-
rection rather than reuse and further development?
(iv)  is it certain that the texts in which Wittgenstein deals with the 
Tractatus have the same authoritative status as the Tractatus itself?
it seems to me that the necessary conditions for the validity of the 
contextual argument are only in place if, and insofar as, the answers to 
these questions are positive. The above four questions could be summa-
rized by the following cardinal question: if it is right that Wittgenstein 
occupies himself with the Tractatus in his later works as if the Tractatus 
were stating nontrivial positions, does this also imply that the Tractatus 
actually does state positions? Yet, asking the “main question” obscures 
the diversity of the issues raised by asking the single questions, and 
therefore also obscures the fact that we should discriminate between 
these questions. Amongst others, we have to attend to: 
•   a  possible  difference  between  the  framework  of  discourse  of  the 
Tractatus and the framework of discourse of later occupation(s) with 
the Tractatus; the fact that Wittgenstein’s texts exhibit narratological 
peculiarities that may make difficult the identification of passages that 
reveal Wittgenstein’s own position (if there is one); 
•   a challenging self-conception of philosophy as utilizing methods similar 
to “therapies,” as it comes across in much of Wittgenstein’s work (e.g. 
Investigations, §133); 
•   the difference between writings and works by Wittgenstein; 
•   the possibility that the critique of the Tractatus may have different aims 
and lines of attack in different places.
The debate surrounding the nW was initiated by strikingly diverg-
ing text-immanent interpretations of the Tractatus. given diametrically 
opposed interpretations, the contextual argument suggests consulting 
the author himself, but from a text-external perspective, namely from 
Wittgenstein’s later criticism of the Tractatus. The author as the author 
of the later critique should then resolve the matter. Thus, the following 
line of thought seems to be correct for the supporters of the contextual 
argument: if diverging text-immanent interpretations of a work exist, we 
can identify the correct one by bringing to light what the author says 
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about his work, even if this is in a different time and place. because 
of the distance gained, the author may later be even more capable of 
determining the content of his work than he was just after having fin-
ished it. (The author can also be consulted in the form of the author 
who wrote preceding versions of the work, or in the form of the author 
who has given other references concerning the work.) Yet the validity of 
the contextual argument depends on the premise that the author who 
occupies himself critically with the Tractatus is driven by the same tasks, 
premises, terms, and ideals as is the author of the Tractatus himself. This 
leads us to the first of our four questions.
(i) The problem of different frameworks of discourse: is it certain that both 
the texts dealing with the Tractatus, and the Tractatus itself, talk about the 
same things?
The validity of deducing from the fact that Wittgenstein later discusses 
the Tractatus in a way that suggests it contains positive views and asser-
tions, to the fact that the Tractatus really does so, depends on the follow-
ing premise being correct: the discourses of Wittgenstein as the author 
of the Tractatus and Wittgenstein as the author of the critique belong to 
the same framework of discourse and thus follow the same constitutive 
concepts and validity criteria. generally speaking, it seems to be com-
monly accepted that such a condition must be fulfilled in order that the 
critique of work A by work B can be binding for the understanding of 
work A. At this point, the Wittgenstein scholar asks herself whether she 
should really consider the possibility that the discourses of Wittgenstein 
(as the author of the Tractatus) and Wittgenstein (as the author of the 
critique of the Tractatus) do not belong to the same framework of dis-
course. This resistance is best responded to with a follow-up question: 
when considering the works of two different authors, we definitely allow 
for the possibility that two different works might not belong to the same 
framework of discourse. Why should we disregard this possibility when 
considering two works by the same author?
scholars agree that the concept of the elementary proposition is a 
fundamental part of the Tractatus’s discourse framework. in the later 
critique this concept is changed from being a part of the insight or 
answer (as in the Tractatus) into being an obstacle on the way to the 
insight (as in the critique of the Tractatus) and hence into being a part 
of the philosophical problem itself. Whereas in the Tractatus the refer-
ence to the world is established by simple names occurring in elemen-
tary propositions that are logically independent of each other, the task 
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of establishing a reference to the world will later be assigned to systems 
of propositions (which are applied to reality like measuring rods), and 
the conception of elementary proposition is problematized and finally 
abandoned. What was this radical change based upon?
The author of the Tractatus had thought that the logical product of 
(mutually exclusive) color statements, such as “a is red & a is green,” 
could be analyzed into a logical contradiction. because of the logical 
independency conception of elementary propositions, in the Tractatus 
color statements could therefore, by definition, not be elementary proposi-
tions (Tractatus 4.211 and 6.3751). An analysis of color statements, which 
was to show that “a is red” and “a is green” logically contradict each 
other, was not undertaken in the Tractatus itself, but discussed in Some 
Remarks on Logical Form (1929).6 it became clear that color statements 
could not be shown to be mutually exclusive on the basis of logical 
syntax alone, and their logical product therefore not a logical contra-
diction; further, color statements could not be shown to be analyzable 
into simple statements of nondegree. 
but if color statements cannot be analyzed into simpler statements of 
nondegree, are they themselves elementary propositions? And if they are, 
what about the logical independency view of elementary propositions? 
And if not for logical contradiction and impossibility, on what basis do 
“a is red” and “a is green” then exclude each other? The answer—phe-
nomenological impossibility (sRLf, p. 31)—conflicts with a view central 
to the Tractatus: that there is only logical impossibility. numbers and 
grades are now admitted “to enter” into elementary propositions (sRLf, 
p. 32), and “a is red” and “a is green” can hereby become elementary 
propositions. The independency conception of elementary propositions 
and the view that elementary propositions are simple are given up. And 
not elementary propositions independent from each other, but systems 
of propositions now link with reality.
To what extent the author of the Tractatus has to give in to this later 
analysis of the color-exclusion problem, and the far-reaching conse-
quences it led to, has been questioned.7 Possibly the post-Tractatus treat-
ment of this problem implies a use of concepts that is different from 
their Tractatus use. This would not be without precedence: even within 
the Tractatus period Wittgenstein did not seem to have been consistent 
in his use of concepts such as “elementarsatz” and “sachverhalt”; see, 
for example, the explanation he gives on August 19, 1919, to Russell 
in the well-known letter from monte cassino: “sachverhalt is, what cor-
responds to an elementarsatz if it is true. Tatsache is, what corresponds 
440 Philosophy and Literature
to the logical product of elementary prop[osition]s when this product 
is true.”8 This explanation seems at odds with Tractatus 2 and 4.25 (and 
others) and is at the least misleading. The same goes for other Tractatus 
concepts: “Wirklichkeit” is in 2.06 defined as the totality of all states of 
affairs (“sachverhalte”), whether they actually exist as facts (“Tatsachen”) 
or not—while “Welt,” at least according to 2.04, means the totality of 
all facts only. but this understanding of the two terms seems not to be 
consistent with such writings as Tractatus 2.063.9
However, for our analysis here, let us assume that we are concerned 
with an adequate correction. can the critique then be regarded as a 
correction of a nontrivial thesis or position? i don’t think that the answer 
is a simple “yes.” The change of the elementary proposition conception 
and later its final abandonment are so fundamental that they naturally 
affect the entire framework of discourse, rather than an issue within 
the discourse only. it would thus not be adequate to regard the correc-
tion of the independency conception as belonging within the Tractatus 
framework: for the Tractatus the independency view of elementary 
propositions had been a conditio sine qua non. in abandoning it, much 
of the Tractatus framework of discourse goes—and much of the Tractatus 
conceptuality, which through this abandonment receives further critique, 
seems no longer the same throughout.
(ii) The problem of the speaker: is it certain that the positive assertions that 
the later critique locates within the Tractatus are also held by the author of 
the Tractatus?
Under question (i) above i have not challenged the assumption that 
the Tractatus’s positions later critically discussed are actually held by the 
Tractatus. i have only asked if they have the same meaning and adopt 
the same functions within the framework of discourse in the Tractatus as 
well as in the later critique. but the nW calls into question whether the 
“picture theory,” for instance, and the view of the elementary proposition 
are in fact kept up at the end of the Tractatus. The nW even calls into 
question that these positions (as views that make any sense and convey 
any meaning) still exist at the end of the Tractatus. This leads us to a 
second condition of the validity of the contextual argument: when the 
critique ascribes positions or assertions to the Tractatus, these naturally 
have to be held by it in order that they can be ascribed to it. The con-
textual argument depends on the premise that the author who occupies 
himself with the Tractatus actually is still the mouthpiece of the author of 
the Tractatus. The correctness of this premise can, however, be doubted.
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Here we are confronted with two meanings of “to hold a position,” 
and we have to distinguish between them. The first is the sense of hold-
ing positions that are not agreed upon and are thus debated. The nW 
negates that the author of the Tractatus wanted to or meant to hold 
positions of that kind. Wittgenstein can be understood in the way that 
he saw his task as working out and expressing (with words or other 
means, e.g., drawings, such as the “eye” in Tractatus 5.6331) the basic 
conditions of symbolic interaction with the world, including meaningful 
language use. insofar as the explication of these conditions embodies 
positions—for instance the so-called picture theory or the conception of 
the elementary proposition—they would have to be trivial and accept-
able to all who deal with the same issues. but does the Tractatus hold, 
alongside such “positions” which we may want to call “transcendental,”10 
other positions that are actually divisive and debated? 
Hacker and Proops give analytical summaries of Tractatus’s “mistakes” 
as identified by Wittgenstein himself, and among them we actually find 
some that we may call “proper” nontrivial positions. one example is the 
view that general propositions are logical sums. but even if the Tractatus 
in fact contains such nontrivial positions, this still does not entail that its 
author has held them. one point against such a conclusion can be educed 
from an approach to Wittgenstein’s texts that is called “polyphonic” and 
distinguishes different voices or narrators in his Investigations.11 such 
a differentiation can also be applied to the Tractatus. on the macro 
level, the nW’s division of the Tractatus into frame and content can be 
read as a differentiation between various main narrators. (However, in 
contrast to a distinctive polyphonic reading, the nW seems to assign 
authorial status to the frame.) but more important, also on the micro 
level (i.e. the content of the Tractatus) we may distinguish several narra-
tors, depending on whether we understand the content as following one 
line of narration or as being composed of various parts (as in a play). 
certain statements of the Tractatus that seem to stand for nontrivial 
positions, could—in a nW reading of the Tractatus—be regarded as 
being associated with narrators who are later overcome by other narra-
tors/voices, or that at least should have been overcome. from such a 
point of view we are thus able to distinguish different narrators within 
the content and say: one narrator makes an assertion that she seriously 
holds, but which will be overcome by another narrator in the course 
of the text. from this perspective, the Tractatus can contain assertions 
without implying that they are kept up at the end. We then do not need 
to ascribe such assertions to the Tractatus, but we can rather regard them 
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as “steps” on the Tractatus’s “therapeutic ladder” only. These assertions 
must be held seriously at some stage, but only in order to be abandoned 
at another stage when being recognized as nonsensical.
Hence, the question whether it is certain that the positive assertions, 
which later critique locates within the Tractatus, were held as positive 
assertions by the author of the Tractatus, cannot be answered with “yes” 
unambiguously. on the one hand, we can argue that the author of the 
Tractatus himself understood certain passages, which are later seen as 
positive assertions, not as such, but rather as explications of conditions of 
any positive assertions. on the other hand, with a polyphonic reading 
or nW “rungs on the ladder” readings (e.g., conant, p. 177), we can 
assume that those positive statements of the Tractatus, which seemed to 
be nontrivial assertions rather than statements of conditions, functioned 
as assertions that are only held temporarily and that are later overcome 
or simply ascribed to a narrator who needs to be overcome. 
it is just a principal point of the nW to assume that the Tractatus 
states and develops certain positions and assertions in order (for the 
author and the reader) in the course of the text to recognize them as 
being illusory, and hence to eventually “throw them away” (see Tractatus 
6.54), so that everything dogmatic is overcome at the end of the work. 
from this perspective, however, the debate is thrown back on its start-
ing point, i.e., to the question of how to interpret the Tractatus by using 
the text-immanent approach, and, further, the question whether certain 
assertions that belong to the content of the Tractatus are overcome or 
upheld at the end of the work. 
but even if we should find the “polyphonic” approach unacceptable 
and think that the Tractatus indeed contains nontrivial claims that are 
made by the author and kept up at the end of the Tractatus, then we 
still have to establish that the assertions in question are of central rather 
than rudimentary importance for the Tractatus, and thus indeed can 
endanger an otherwise overall undogmatic nature of the work.
(iii) The problem of enhancement: is it certain that the function of the critique 
of the Tractatus is correction rather than reuse and further development?
for further analysis of the nature of Wittgenstein’s critique of the 
Tractatus, we need to distinguish clearly between two questions: the first 
is why the author of the Tractatus later treated the Tractatus in the way 
he did; the second is what we should consider crucial in order for us to 
decide what the later Wittgenstein really thought about the Tractatus. i 
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will start (but not finish) dealing with the second question in the last 
section of this paper. concerning the first question, the supporters of 
the contextual argument think that it is not plausible to assume that 
with the Tractatus, Wittgenstein composed an undogmatic work: his 
later discussion of the Tractatus can be understood in the sense that 
Wittgenstein affirms some of the Tractatus’s assertions and positions 
while criticizing others—thus, that Wittgenstein himself seems to take 
the Tractatus and its positions quite seriously.
now, how can the fact that Wittgenstein took the Tractatus seriously 
be related to the claim of the nW that the author of the Tractatus 
considered the propositions of the content (vs. the frame) nonsensical? 
could it be that he—as the author of the Tractatus—considered them 
nonsensical, and yet later—as the author of the critique—discussed 
them as if they were meant seriously or even that they were expressing 
nontrivial theses? could it even be that he, as author of the critique, 
considered them nonsensical and yet simultaneously discussed them as 
if they were expressing such theses?
it should have become clear under (ii) that the fact that Wittgenstein 
criticized theses taken from the Tractatus does not necessarily imply that 
Wittgenstein had to assume that the Tractatus actually holds these theses. 
it could be the case that the passages in the Tractatus, which appear to 
be theses and theories, are no longer valid, but rather are overcome at 
the end of the Tractatus, and it could be the case that Wittgenstein, as 
the author of the critique, had not forgotten about the fact that this was 
meant to be so—and yet he could have had reasons to interpret them, 
still or again, as positive theses. or it could be the case that the author of 
the Tractatus was not aware of the fact that his work after all contained 
controversial nontrivial theses and that he actually thought he composed 
an undogmatic work through and through, a work whose content the 
reader of the Tractatus will eventually recognize as being nonsensical.
Hence, while the author of the Tractatus could have mistakenly thought 
not to express any such theses, Wittgenstein’s later critique would start 
with identifying and working out the controversial theses content of 
the Tractatus. or, the author of the Tractatus could have meant not to 
hold controversial theses and could largely have succeeded in this, but 
still have committed himself on a few minor points (such as the issue 
of general propositions) to controversial views. in neither of these cases 
can we say that the author of the Tractatus wanted to hold controversial 
theses. now, if also the author of the critique might have seen it in this 
light, why could he have still been interested in ascribing controversial 
and positive theses to the Tractatus?
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The author of the critique might have pursued a goal that, though not 
resulting in ascribing nontrivial theses to the author of the Tractatus, is 
yet interested in formulating such theses based on the Tractatus. it has 
always been an important element of Wittgenstein’s working method 
to engage in earlier texts and thoughts in order to either criticize or 
develop them further in some kind of self-review—no matter whether 
they were well worth criticizing or not. for this reason, Wittgenstein did 
not necessarily ascribe all the theses he in his later critique extracted 
from the Tractatus to the author of the Tractatus. furthermore, it was not 
necessarily Wittgenstein’s intention to correct the theses of the Tractatus. 
Rather, it could have been his intention to scrutinize certain theses and 
arguments that could be considered to originate in the Tractatus or to 
be primarily promotable on the basis of the Tractatus.
Another case of Wittgenstein’s critical self-review or self-reception 
reveals that, if this interpretation is right, this working method would not 
be particularly unusual for him: during the summer of 1931, Wittgenstein 
revisited and started scrutinizing a typescript he had dictated one year 
earlier: Ts 208.12 The extent to which he dissociated himself from the 
earlier piece of writing is in parts surprising. some of the positions 
that manifest themselves in Ts 208 are said to be invalid (“gelten so 
wenig wie . . .”) or nonsense (“Unsinn”). now, one may suggest that 
Wittgenstein’s philosophical positions at this time underwent rapid 
changes, so that a position held yesterday is rejected today. However, 
the better interpretation seems to be this: Ts 208 was used as material 
for further philosophizing. Ts 208 had—through rearrangement of 
its remarks—become (probably in the autumn of 1930) another piece 
of writing that persisted in spite of the critique of Ts 208: Ts 209, the 
Philosophical Remarks published in 1964.13 Thus, although we may accept 
the fact that the remarks in Ts 208 were critically scrutinized during 
the summer of 1931, we do not need to stop considering Ts 209—the 
Philosophical Remarks, which consists of nothing but remarks taken from 
Ts 20814—as a work with its own purpose and with a meaning indepen-
dent of the critical revision of Ts 208.
As with Ts 208, Wittgenstein did not always need to have done justice 
to the Tractatus while scrutinizing it. it could well be that the author of 
the critique understood the Tractatus in the same way as the author of 
the Tractatus had understood it, but he may still have found it appropri-
ate for his philosophical work to treat the Tractatus in a way that differs 
from this understanding. Wittgenstein does not seem to have cared a lot 
about presenting other philosophers in a correct and unabbreviated way, 
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and the picture he draws of them varies constantly (see, for example, 
Wittgenstein’s discussions of Augustine’s view on the learning and essence 
of language, and especially about the mistake Augustine makes). Why 
would we expect the critique to treat the author of the Tractatus more 
fairly, and why do we demand that he should have treated him differ-
ently if this did not serve his purpose? in more general terms: on what 
grounds should we forbid an author, and on what grounds should the 
author forbid himself, while composing work B, to treat in this work his 
earlier work A in a way that differs from the way he had understood and 
treated work A while composing it? Rupert Read thinks: “Wittgenstein 
repeatedly projected ‘positions’ contemplated during his ‘transitional 
period’ back onto T L-P [Tractatus logico-philosophicus].”15 baker and 
Hacker seem open to the possibility that Wittgenstein’s post-Tractatus 
representations of the Tractatus differ significantly from Tractatus’s 
self-understanding.16
if it is the case that Wittgenstein, at the beginning of the nineteen-
thirties, depicted the Tractatus in a way that varies from the way he 
would have depicted it as the author of the Tractatus, then this has 
definite implications for assessing the relevance of the critique for our 
understanding of the Tractatus. but while demonstrating that the criti-
cal reception of the Tractatus is not marked by misunderstandings or 
misrepresentations, we will sooner or later again reach the discussion 
that was the starting point for the contextual argument, i.e., the debate 
on how to interpret the Tractatus using a text-immanent approach.
(iv) The problem of preliminary stages: is it certain that the texts in which 
Wittgenstein deals with the Tractatus have the same authoritative status as 
the Tractatus itself?
i have discussed the fate of Ts 208 whose content was harshly criti-
cized and yet, in Ts 209 with the very same remarks brought to a certain 
fulfilling end. This teaches us that we have to beware of regarding in an 
undiscriminating way Wittgenstein’s critical occupation with something 
he had said earlier. it may be that his critique is not authoritative for 
the comprehension and classification of what he had said earlier: in 
his new occupation with it, Wittgenstein could treat what he had said 
earlier as that which is now set into a new context. 
Within the framework of the contextual argument, we could point not 
only to later, but also earlier works by Wittgenstein, e.g., to the notebooks 
and diaries from the first World War, mss 101–103:17 is it not the case 
that proper, nontrivial positions that we might want to assign to the 
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Tractatus appear even more clearly in those early texts from which the 
Tractatus eventually emerged? True, positive positions seem to have been 
developed and defended in mss 101–103. but does this fact suffice to 
conclude that the same is valid for the Tractatus, which emerged from 
these manuscripts? no. Although we can definitely understand mss 
101–103, the forerunners of the Tractatus, as developing and defending 
certain controversial assertions and positions, we are neither entitled 
nor do we need to conclude from this that the same is true for the 
Tractatus, into which these manuscripts find their way.
Likewise, from finding remarks in the Investigations that were partly 
produced as early as in the beginning of the thirties, it does not follow 
that these remarks have the same meaning and function as they do 
in their contexts of origin.18 for this reason, we also cannot say that a 
certain interpretation of the Investigations is correct (or more correct) 
just because it matches pre-stages of the Investigations better than com-
peting interpretations.
These negative answers are due to the following: first, one and the 
same remark can have different meanings and functions, depending 
on the context. And second, we are well advised to distinguish between 
works and nonworks by Wittgenstein. When examining the text-external 
evidence referred to by the contextual argument, we discover that it 
arises equally well from notebooks and from more developed writings; 
as well from records of lectures and conversations as from Wittgenstein’s 
own manuscripts. Yet it might be crucial to differentiate more precisely 
between different types of transmissions and different types of texts, and 
to ascribe different statuses of authorization to these types. We agree 
that not all of the drafts, sketches, etc., that we prepare for our own 
articles are similarly suitable to serve as guidelines for the interpreta-
tion of our finished articles. it is, of course, not unusual (and is even 
rather common) to refer to all accessible writings by Wittgenstein when 
interpreting one of them. 
However, the problem at issue concerns the difference between the 
status, relevance, and functionality of a text in a notebook and the 
status, relevance, and functionality of a text that has been prepared 
to be published as a work. Therefore, it seems necessary to provide a 
distinction between the writings and the works of Wittgenstein. We can 
rank the Tractatus and the Investigations among the latter—but not so, 
for instance, the three notebooks mss 101–103 from the time before 
the Tractatus (1914–17), nor the four volumes mss 105–108 (1929–30), 
nor most of the other texts from the Wittgenstein Nachlass. This, of 
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course, by no means implies that those writings that are “only” writings 
and not works should not be considered important for our investiga-
tion and understanding of Wittgenstein’s philosophy and philosophical 
authorship.
if the reader—on grounds of what has been said above under ques-
tion (iii)—accepts that at least parts of Wittgenstein’s later occupation 
with the Tractatus could have had other good purposes than to correct 
the positions of the Tractatus, he or she will also be able to accept that 
theses and positions in Wittgenstein’s manuscripts not only may, but 
also had to be developed and supported. Hence, dogmatism and theses 
definitely have their place in Wittgenstein’s authorship, without having 
their presence betray his undogmatic program. The crucial question 
is where and how dogmatism finds its place: is it dealt with in a way that 
does not force us to say that the author holds these dogmatic views? 
(This is a main idea of the polyphonic approach to the Investigations; 
see question (ii) above). on the basis of this discussion we could sug-
gest a new criterion for determining what is a work by Wittgenstein: 
a characteristic of a work by Wittgenstein is that the dogmatic parts of 
the writings that have led to this work are undogmatized within it (and 
hence that it attempts to avoid supporting any nontrivial theses).19 
insofar as we find writings in the Wittgenstein Nachlass which seem 
not yet to have reached this stage within the process of undogmatiz-
ing, we could consider them as on their way to becoming a work rather 
than being works themselves. consequently, on the one hand, the fact 
that Wittgenstein occupied himself critically with the Tractatus and 
treated it from a dogmatic perspective does not necessarily question the 
undogmatic direction of the Tractatus itself. on the other hand, such 
an undogmatic understanding of the Tractatus or the Investigations does 
not neglect the fact that there are indeed dogmatic parts contained 
within each (and this is what the supporters of the contextual argument 
mainly focus on). on the contrary, it even presupposes it. Hacker seems 
to regard this view of Wittgenstein’s philosophical praxis as a possibility, 
albeit he does not accept it (Hacker, p. 379).
i said that we should be careful when trying to determine the mean-
ing and function of the Tractatus by referring to texts that do not have 
the same authoritative status as the Tractatus itself has. “To be care-
ful” does not mean that contextual approaches are principally to be 
excluded, but only that they are to be considered as potentially ques-
tionable moves, and to be scrutinized with regard to the authoritative 
and text-genetic status of the evidence referred to. in searching for the 
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later Wittgenstein’s view about the Tractatus, we are thus well advised 
to turn toward the works of his later philosophy. for this purpose, the 
following, and perhaps only the following, comes into consideration: 
the Investigations, specifically its Part i.
III
i have used questions arising from the contextual argument to draw 
attention to issues pertaining to Wittgenstein’s philosophical authorship, 
which i consider relevant for the assessment of Wittgenstein’s philosophical 
self-reception, in particular his critique of the Tractatus. Does this critique 
tell us something about how the Tractatus is to be understood? not nec-
essarily, or only together with certain conditions being fulfilled. While it 
often seems tacitly presupposed that these conditions are in place, this is 
indeed a matter of a discussion that still seems to be underdeveloped and 
little addressed. in response to question (iv), i conclude that it is indeed 
the so-called Part i of the Investigations to which we should refer when 
looking for Wittgenstein’s authoritative view on the Tractatus. However, 
i do not have space here to elaborate on Wittgenstein’s attitude toward 
the Tractatus, as it is documented in the Investigations. 
i want to conclude by pointing to an element that seems most central 
in the Investigations’ critique of the Tractatus. in contrast to the Tractatus, 
the Investigations promotes not only a different understanding of the role 
and status of logic in philosophy, but of logic as such: while the author of 
the Tractatus—without being aware of it—assumed and developed a norma-
tive logic to which reality had to correspond in order to be expressible, 
the Investigations states that a multiplicity of logical forms are involved in 
meaningful language use (§§ 23, 46, 97, 114). but this point of disagree-
ment between the Investigations and the Tractatus again does not amount 
to disagreement on substantial theses; rather, it relates to a change in 
principal attitude and in the understanding of the nature of the condi-
tions that frame language use. 
How then, could the Tractatus be understood by the Investigations as 
dogmatic and promoting nontrivial theses? As soon as Wittgenstein let 
go of the normative conception of logic (which carried the Tractatus’s 
requirement for determinacy of sense) and changed his view of logic’s 
role in philosophy, some of the statements of the Tractatus turned out to 
be unnecessary and unjust controversial theses, rather than attempts to 
express the conditions necessary for the working of our language—and 
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this is one of the reasons why the Tractatus could become a work of dogma, 
while it originally may have been composed as a work without it. 
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